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Summary 
 
The first chapter of this thesis will examine the origins of two interests of the EU, 
the economic freedoms and the social rights. It shall be noted that the social rights 
and economic freedoms are hereinafter referred to as interests of the EU, 
however, the European Union (EU) as an institution is certainly keeping further 
objectives as interests to obtain, foremost the peace between the Member States. 
The thesis shall further provide for the birth of the two interests through 
providing for relevant legislation. The economic purpose was initiated with the 
commencement of the union and already incorporated as an aim and objective of 
the union following the Second World War in 1951 with the TOP. It was later 
emphasised with its actual status of being the internal market freedoms, through 
the European Economic Community Treaty (EEC Treaty) and the Treaty of Rome 
(TOR) in 1957. The social fundamental rights were, as aforementioned, 
distinguished as being general principles with the ECHR during the same decade; 
however the status has changed over time, and this to a greater, more compressed 
extent than that of the economic freedoms.  
 
Following sections shall provide for definitions of what the two interests actually 
are; the economic freedoms are referring to fundamental freedoms and the free 
movement of persons, capital, goods and services. This is commonly referred to 
as the economic freedoms as it, in this thesis, is contrasted with the social rights, 
the latter holding a purpose referring more to the human right than the economic 
such. The social rights are fundamental rights and those the human citizen of the 
Member States of the EU holds in order for them to enjoy a life according to an 
absolute minimum standard.  
 
Furthermore, the subsequent chapter comes to deal with the current sources of the 
two interests and holds that the economic freedoms are to be found in and defined 
through the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union (TFEU) and the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU) and similarly to the social rights, also in the  Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) judgments; case law. Social rights are for 
most EU Member States to be found in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
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European Union (CFREU), and for those countries claiming an opt out to this 
protocol; the fundamental rights are to be found under the ECHR. Finally, social 
rights additionally are considered fundamental rights thus are found under the 
General Principles of the European Union (GPEU). Both interests are together 
enjoying the status of being primary sources of EU legislation due to the sources 
in which they are to be found. 
 
The two interests has come to see a development in standing and position within 
the EU; before its current equal weight the economic freedoms held a somewhat 
more significant importance within the EU. The following sections deals with the 
transformation of the two interests, how it came about and why it seemed to have 
happened when it did. This section is existent due to the following section, in 
order to understand the  gone through by the CJEU in current case law, one shall 
find the importance in educating oneself thoroughly in the previous events 
leading up to and perhaps causing the current view of the judges and the 
legislation. Thus, this heading will foremost provide for an  of the more apparent 
transformation of the social rights and its development; through the Treaty of 
Lisbon (TOL) and additionally with the CFREU. Nonetheless, the development in 
the economic sphere with the change in status through the citizen’s directive shall 
indeed also be accentuated.  
 
The next chapter shall enhance the actual meeting of the two interests through the 
judgement and case Schmidberger. The case concerns the conflict between the 
social fundamental right to assembly and expression balanced against the 
economic fundamental freedom of movement of goods. The case before the 
CJEU had not been witnessed earlier to this extent, as the similarities in the value 
of the presentation of the two interests came to constitute a conflict. In the 
Schmidberger case the CJEU resorted to the proportionality test as distinguished 
by T. Tridimas; a test based on establishing whether one can justify the restriction 
of one interest through the necessity of achieving the other. 
 
Subsequent chapters will bring light to the CJEU judgements that came to follow 
the Schmidberger judgement, starting with Omega, concerning the conflict 
between the social right of human dignity balanced against the freedom of 
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movement of goods and services. This was the first recognised case after 
Schmidberger as the CJEU came to adopt the proportionality test in order to make 
certain an existing balance before judging in favour of either interest. Omega was 
followed by Viking Line where the CJEU established that the proportionality test 
was for the national courts of the Member States to decide. Laval, similarly to 
Viking Line concerned the right of collective action contra the freedom of 
establishment, here however, the proportionality test was not carried out to the 
full. The two last cases analysed are Promusicae and Scarlet Extended, 
concerning the right to protection of data balanced with the freedom to conduct 
business and right to intellectual property.  
Following disagreements and speculations since the Omega up until Scarlet 
Extended, it was argued that leaving the discretion to the Member States may 
result in consequences harming the harmonisation, and worse, the Supremacy of 
EU law, should the correct instructions by the EU not be followed. It can be 
concluded that there still is a notion of uncertainty as regards this area, despite the 
fact that the CJEU seems to have decided its measures to deal with the said 
conflict.  
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Purpose and delimitation 
 
This thesis shall seek to scrutinise the transformation but also current interplay 
between EU economic freedoms and social rights when met, foremost through 
CJEU judgements. These rights and freedoms will be referred to as interests for 
the purpose of this thesis. In order to do so it shall in the first chapter provide for 
information necessary for the readers understanding, such as definitions, origins 
and legislation linked to EU economic freedoms and social rights. This chapter 
however shall be limited in terms of any wider historic . 
 
Furthermore, this thesis shall shed some, but limited, light to the expansion of the 
EU objectives; the economic freedoms formed its shape just after the birth of the 
Union, whereas the social rights came to develop and receive more attention 
several decades later, through the enforcement of the TOL. Despite the somewhat 
brief declaration of the abovementioned extended emphasis of objectives, this 
thesis shall omit to provide a deeper scrutiny as to whether economic freedoms 
today hold a stronger position than social rights within the EU. 
 
In order for this thesis to promptly determine the interplay and conflict between 
the two interests when met, a thorough  of relevant judgements of the CJEU shall 
be conducted. Finally, judgements analysed shall be; foremost Schmidberger, 
closely followed by Omega, Viking Line, Laval, Promisucae and Scarlet 
extended. Limitations as regards judgements shall lie beyond the mere referral to 
other cases when analysing the six judgments mentioned. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The EU has, from its formation to its current state of being a union, seen a 
constant development on many different levels and in many different aspects. The 
objectives of the EU, as found in the TFEU and foremost TEU
1
 indicate, amongst 
other, the aim to sustain an internal market and to promote social justice.
2
 The 
internal market being the ground for the interest of the economical fundamental 
freedoms, free movement of capital, persons, goods which was given emphasis 
already with the EEC Treaty in the late 1950’s.3 The social justice was already 
incorporated in the ECHR with the Treaty of Amsterdam (TOA) and 
simultaneously given status of general principle; it has however not had its 
current central status for as long as the freedoms.
4
 This thesis shall firstly bring to 
light the transformation of the status of the two named interests; the economic 
freedoms and the social rights within the EU. However, it shall foremost provide 
for an  of how the CJEU has dealt with the actual meeting of these two interests, 
the balancing of priority and measures used to establish a fair such followed by 
potential consequences, through examining relevant case law such as 
Schmidberger, Omega, Laval, Viking Line, Promusicae and Scarlet Extended
5
 
and scholarly opinions. To start, however, it shall shortly provide for the origins 
of the interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 TEU Title 1, Article 1, TEU Article 3(3). 
2
 Id. 
3
 J. Fairhurst, Law of the European Union (8th edition, Pearson Education Ltd 2010) pp. 3-33. 
4
 J. Fairhurst, Law of the European Union (8th edition, Pearson Education Ltd 2010) pp. 3-33. 
5
 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, Case C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-9609, 
Case C-438/05 Viking Line [2007] ECR I-10779, Case C--341/05 Laval [2007] ECR I-11767, 
Case C-275/06 Promusicae [2008] ECR 1-271 and Case C -70/10 Scarlet Extended [2011] 
ECDR 4. 
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2 The origins of economic freedoms 
and social rights  
2.1 Introductory Remarks  
 
This chapter shall seek to provide for general information on the accruement, 
legal definitions and sources of the economic fundamental freedoms and the 
social fundamental rights of the EU. The four freedoms; the movement of capital, 
persons, goods and establishment (hereinafter and commonly referred to as the 
economic freedoms) are one component of the two folded conflict where the 
social rights serve as the second. Economic freedoms are held to promote the 
internal market of the EU where free trade and movement configure to aid the 
mutual aims and objectives of the member states of the EU. Social rights advert 
to those serving to balance circumstances for the citizens of the EU, conditions 
that are considered essential for human beings to live their life in dignity.  
 
 
2.2 The birth of the two interests 
 
The EU as an institution has long seen a development of economic freedoms 
conjointly with a progress of forming its social and fundamental rights. Following 
the Second World War, in 1951, the European nations initiated the European Coal 
and Steel Community through the TOP, with the aim to promote peace through 
sharing objectives with regards to politics and economy.
6
 The community was in 
1957 followed by the European Economic Community: based on the EEC Treaty 
and developed through the TOR with the idea to formulate a common market of 
economic interests.
7
 The EEC Treaty came to distinguish the task of the union to 
work towards a market promoting the four freedoms; the free movement of 
                                                 
6 J. Fairhurst, Law of the European Union (8th edition, Pearson Education Ltd 2010) pp. 3-33. 
7 Id. 
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goods, persons, services and capital.
8
 In 1992, after years of refining aims and 
purposes of the union, the Treaty of Maastricht (TOM) formed what we today 
know as the European Union and the TEU. Moreover, following the subsequent 
enforcement of the TOL at the end of 2009, the EEC - the later the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) - was renamed into TFEU and 
the CFREU came into force seeking to serve as an initiative supporting social 
rights.
9
 The EU as an institution hold, as abovementioned, one of its main 
objectives to promote the peace between the Member States, however this being 
the union’s interest doesn’t necessarily place it on the same level as the two 
interests of social rights and economic freedoms hereinafter discussed. The 
objective of peace can be distinguished as the reason that the citizens of the EU 
hold their rights and freedoms, in order for the Member States and their citizens 
to peacefully be united through the EU.
10
 
 
The TEU together with the TFEU provides for aims and objectives of the EU, as 
stated in TEU.
11
  The objectives of the EU, in relation to social rights and 
economic freedoms, as provided in Article 3 (3) TEU declares that: 
 
“The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable 
development of  
Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly 
competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social 
progress (…). 
It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social 
justice and protection (…) “.12 
 
The fact that the EU today through the TEU and TFEU has codified their aims to 
establish an internal market and promote social justice shows that these two 
interests are of high significance for the EU to maintain. It can be argued that the 
actual importance lies within the interplay between these interests when met, this 
                                                 
8
  Id. 
9 Id. 
10
 J. Fairhurst, Law of the European Union (8th edition, Pearson Education Ltd 2010) pp. 3-33. 
11 TEU Title 1, Article 1. 
12 Ibid. at Article 3(3). 
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however, shall be dealt with in chapter three and four. 
 
2.3 Defining economic freedoms and its sources 
 
In order to fully grasp the conflict that may occur when considering economic 
and social interests within the EU, it could be argued to be of importance to first 
define the concepts discussed. Further, after understanding the two prerogatives, 
there may in certain cases exist a distinction of whom these rights applies to. 
Moreover, having two interests conflicting with one another, a second matter may 
be brought to light: if one may justify the restriction of the other, how does their 
legal status then appear? 
 
The TFEU, a source of primary legislation, has direct effect and together with all 
other EU Treaties, the CFREU and the GPEU, it may impose rights or obligations 
on individuals forcing it to be recognised by national courts and, indeed, the 
CJEU itself.
13 
In the TFEU, Article 26 states that the EU shall, in relation to the 
internal market, make certain the use of measures with the objective to 
establishing an internal market in accordance with the EU Treaties.
14
 It further 
describes that the internal market shall be an area lacking of borders where a free 
movement of persons, services, capital and goods shall be promoted. Finally, it 
gives the Council the responsibility to ensure, on the initiative of the 
Commission, a sustainable progress in respective areas.
15 
When considering 
Article 26 TFEU, it may be argued to be of importance to additionally review the 
impact that Article 114 may have.
16
 The article has as its aim to work towards the 
progression of harmonisation of the EU and is a codified source encouraging to 
the bodies of the EU to make certain that the member states contrastively work to 
ensure the efficiency of the internal market. The certain emphasis put on 
harmonisation, and a positive such, aims to create a uniform idea of what the 
internal market between the different national constitutions shall seek to rest 
                                                 
13 A. Kaczorowska, European Union Law (3rd edition, Routledge 2013) pp. 108-19. 
14 TFEU, Article 26. 
15 Ibid. at Title 1, Article 26. 
16 Ibid. at Article 26, 114. 
14 
 
upon.
17
 The four freedoms are defined to be the free movement of persons, 
capital, goods and services, nonetheless, the EU citizen may also enjoy the right 
of establishment, referring to the right to pursue a career as self-employed or 
other business and employment related activities as distinguished in Chapter 2, 
Article 49.
18 
 
 
2.4 Defining social rights and its sources  
 
With the development of the EU and reorganisation of its aims and objectives, the 
status of the citizen and its social fundamental rights has come to adopt different 
forms. When the EEC Treaty conjointly with the Euratom was outlined, there 
were no indications towards implementing neither fundamental nor social rights 
favouring the EU citizens status.
19
 Today, in accordance with Article 6 TEU, there 
are three express provisions providing for social rights, namely; the CFREU, the 
ECHR and the GPEU, the latter referring to rights holding the legal status of 
primary legislation such as the fundamental rights as distinguished in both 
CFERU and ECHR.
20
 Furthermore, the EU has during the 21st century continued 
to develop agencies and mediators for the citizen’s fundamental rights to be 
respected, amongst them is the EU Fundamental Rights Agency which foremost 
seeks to provide advice in order for the EU and member states to follow set out 
legislation.
21
 
 
It could be argued of great importance to see to the individual member states and 
their specific relations relating to the social rights in order to retrieve a full 
understanding of how they would come to form a part of national law. However, 
it could be considered most efficient to view the CFREU as the main source of 
social rights prior to the ECHR for most member states, partly as the CFREU is 
                                                 
17 I. Maletic, The Law and Policy of Harmonisation in Europe's Internal Market (1st edition, 
Edwar Elgar Publishing Litied 2013) pp. 1-28. 
18 TFEU, Chapter 2, Article 49. 
19 P. Craig, G. De Burca, EU Law (15th edition, Oxford University Press 2011) pp. 362-70. 
20 Id. 
21 EU Fundamental Rights Agency website, http://fra.europa.eu/en/about-fra  
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amongst other sources, stemming from the ECRH.
22
 Additionally, the CJEU has 
manifested its desire to consider the CFREU as its main source of law in its 
judgements.
23
 Further, the CFREU, through the TOL, is held to carry the same 
legal status as the Treaties, as stated in Article 1(8) TOL.
24
 However, for a 
member state to hold the obligation to observe the rights under the CFREU, the 
state must have agreed to the TOL in full, as is not the case with the Czech 
Republic, Poland and the United Kingdom, citizens of the opposing nations 
would consequently apply the social rights of the second and third sources 
mentioned when the matter has a distinguishable EU nature.
25 
As one of the main 
keystones of social fundamental rights of the EU, the GPEU, considered primary 
legislation, were developed and referred to by CJEU.
26
 The principles are partly 
to be found codified in EU legislation such as the EU Treaties or CFREU and are 
additionally serving as one of the EU sources of law. The fundamental right as a 
part of the GPEU explains the citizens’ rights though the ECHR and subsequently 
the CFREU. 
27
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 CFREU 
23 Discussion document of the CJEU on accession of the EU to the ECHR, Luxembourg, 5 May 
2010, para 2. 
24 TOL, Article 1(8). 
25 P. Craig, G. De Burca, EU Law (15th edition, Oxford University Press 2011) pp. 362-70. 
26 T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd edition, Oxford University Press 2006) 
pp. 1-38. 
27 Id. 
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3 The transformation of economic 
freedoms and social rights 
 
3.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
My objective with this chapter has neither been to dissect in depth the historic 
background of these two interests, nor to investigate whether either of the two 
interests today holds any superiority above the other. It can be argued to, 
throughout time, these interests have not been separated with borders that are too 
definite, however, in order to correctly measure the conflict possibly occurring 
when the two interest meet, it ought to be of importance to understand the 
transformation in standing of these interests. The economic freedoms were 
founded to be a cornerstone of the EU long before its social rights reached equal 
status. The social rights of the EU can on the one hand be argued to have 
witnessed a more explosive and somewhat compressed development as the citizen 
of the EU today, as opposed to merely 4 years ago, may enjoy a protection of its 
social rights with the TOL and the incorporated CFREU. The economic freedoms 
on the other hand have indeed come to develop, this, however occurring over a 
longer span of time with less expeditious changes. Notwithstanding, with the 
Citizens Directive, the EU citizen can now enjoy a wider array of economic 
freedoms, and in particular its free movement within the internal market. 
 
 
3.2 The Treaty of Lisbon and the motion of social rights  
 
With the TOL in 2009, and its mandate of the CFREU to transform into its now 
binding form, the EU came to see further changes in the field of social rights. The 
TOL came along with the accession to the ECHR and together with the demand 
of a framework comprising of especially on the topic learned people, the new era 
demanded hired experts in the human rights sector to counsel the Fundamental 
17 
 
Rights Agency, Council Secretary General and to aid the Representatives of 
Foreign and Security Policy.
28
 With the development and reorganisation 
following the TOL, public recognition were granted to judgements of the CJEU 
regarding fundamental rights, additionally, the approval of fundamental rights 
stemming from the ECHR as a source of EU legislation.
29
 
 
 
3.3 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
 
The CFREU is based around its 6 Chapters comprising of 54 Articles where 
human dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizens rights, justice and general 
provisions are being dealt with.
30
 The Second Chapter provides for the freedoms 
such as right to protection of personal data, freedom of expression and 
information and freedom of assembly. These rights can be argued to be political 
rights, and they are adopted from the ECHR. This is the chapter where the 
distinction between the social right and economic freedom more commonly is to 
be found and come to conflict.
31
 In the cases defined in this thesis, chapter three 
and four, the conflicting meeting of social rights are commonly balanced against 
the economic freedom of movement of goods and freedom to provide services.
32
 
 
3.4 Free movement of workers 
 
The social rights and the economic freedoms have both come to see development 
and transformation with the evolvements of the EU. It can be argued that these 
interests overlap in some areas and that there are not always clear distinctions 
between the two of them. The free movement of workers and, later persons, has 
                                                 
28
 P. Craig, G. De Burca, EU Law (15th edition, Oxford University Press 2011) pp. 480-82. 
29  Id. 
30 TFEU, Chapter 1. 
31 Ibid. at Chapter 2. 
32
   Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659, Case C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-9609, 
Case C-438/05 Viking Line [2007] ECR I-10779, Case C--341/05 Laval [2007] ECR I-11767, 
Case C-275/06 Promusicae [2008] ECR 1-271 and Case C -70/10 Scarlet Extended [2011] 
ECDR 4. 
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been a vital component in the field for both economic and social interests in the 
EU.
33
 
When the TOR in 1957 first came to introduce the concept of free movement of 
workers, it could be argued to have been holding a rather economical angle in 
terms of objective, as it was narrowed down to benefitting merely the moving 
workers and economically active persons rather than EU citizens and persons in 
general.
34 
 
Since April 2004 the Citizens Directive has together with the TFEU governed the 
area of law concerning the free moment of persons and now also non-
economically active persons and unemployed persons can enjoy more freedoms.
35  
Citizens Directive, Article 6 entitles the EU citizen to a right of residence in any 
other EU member state for a time period of up to three months, irrespective of 
whether the citizen is economically active or not.
36
 Should the citizen seek to stay 
for a time period beyond the three months threshold, he or she must fulfil certain 
conditions provided for in the directive. One of these conditions rest upon the 
criteria of being just economically active, however, further approved categories 
are also citizens proving the possession of sufficient resources in addition to 
having a sickness insurance, and citizens to family members fulfilling the 
conditions.
37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33
 J. Fairhurst, Law of the European Union (7th edition, Pearson Education Limited 2010) pp. 
370-75 
34 TOR, Article 48. 
35 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004. 
36 Ibid at Article 6. 
37 Ibid at Article 7. 
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4 The meeting of the prerogatives and 
the approach by the CJEU 
 
4.1 Introductory Remarks  
 
As the change in the positioning of the two interests came to develop over time 
and to see final arrangements with the commencement of the new millennium, the 
new judgements of the CJEU and its jurisprudence came to see a change. In 2003 
the reasoning by the CJEU in the Austrian case Schmidberger
38
 came to shape 
new initiatives though its questioning whether the disputed social rights or 
economic freedoms were to be favoured. The conflict itself was not of complete 
novelty since the case Commission v France
39
 as argued had some distinct 
similarities, however, the assessment of the outcome – the balancing of the two 
interests measured against the proportionality principle had not been carried out 
similarly before.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38
 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659 
39
 Case C-265/95 Commission v France [1995] ECR I-6959 
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4.2 Schmidberger 2003 
4.2.1 Facts 
 
In June, 1998, an Austrian association working to protect the biosphere in the 
Alpine region sent a notifying letter to the Austrian government informing them 
that a demonstration was to be undertaken a month later.
40
 This demonstration 
would result in the temporary closure of the A13 Brenner Motorway, a highly 
trafficked transport route spanning from Germany, through Austria to Italy. By 
this stage, the association had informed concerned parties and the Austrian 
authorities took the initiative not to ban the demonstration but omitted to consider 
whether it could infringe EU law.
41
  
 
Due to the closure of the motorway, Schmidberger, an international vehicle 
transport company lost an estimation of Austrian Schilling (ATS) 140 000 as their 
lorries could not make use of the said transport route. Schmidberger brought 
forward a claim to the Austrian authorities seeking damages for its loss, arguing 
that its economic freedom; the movement of goods, was restricted as the 
authorities had failed to ban the demonstration. Furthermore, Austria was 
according to the claimant not able to justify the closing of the motorway with 
claiming the protesters social rights; right to freedoms of expression and 
assembly, consequently Austria was argued in breach of EU law. The claim was 
met by rejection on the grounds that the Austrian authorities had made certain the 
facts that the actors in Germany, Austria and Italy were properly informed of the 
ban and that the demonstration did not constitute in any traffic jams or similar. 
Following the national judgement, Schmidberger appealed, whereupon the 
question was referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.
42
 
 
                                                 
40
 Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659 
41
 Id. 
42
 Id. 
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4.2.2 Judgement  
 
The main question referred for a preliminary ruling was whether the omission by 
Austrian authorities to ban the demonstration constituted in an unjustified 
restriction of the said economic freedom, and fundamental freedom of the EU, the 
free movement of goods, and foremost Article 34, 35 and 36 TFEU.
43
 In the 
judgement, the CJEU referred to Article 36 TFEU
44
 declaring that quantitative 
restrictions on imports and measures having equivalent effect, as in Cassis de 
Dijon
45
, are prohibited between the EU member states. Further, that a quantitative 
restriction on exports and all measures having equivalent effect indeed too are 
prohibited. This, as settled in Dassonville
46
 and effectively discussed in 
Commission v France,
47
 was said to intentionally eliminate the free intra 
community trade as it, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially did not intend 
to eliminate internal barriers in the market of the EU. Consequently, the CJEU 
argued that it was the duty of the Member state to fulfil obligations required to 
respect economic freedoms, as cited from Commission v France.
48
 Therefore, 
only if the failure to ban the demonstration be objectively justified, the CJEU 
would see that Austria had not breached EU rules in its actions. 
 
In aiming to seek for a justification of the restriction, the desire by the Austrian 
authorities to consider and respect the social rights of the protesters, then derived 
from the ECHR, was apparent. For reference, the Austrian court further 
questioned whether the economic freedoms here prevailed of the social rights. 
The CJEU further mentioned that, as the fundamental social rights are forming an 
integral factor of the GPEU, it was indeed of high importance to consider the 
constitutional traditions of the Member State in relation to the ECHR, as 
distinguished in Connolly v Commission.
49
 However as the Member States and 
the EU, in this matter concerning the protection of social rights, are both to 
respect and protect them, a valid objective was formed which justified the 
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restriction, consequently the CJEU held that the restriction of the freedom was 
proportionate to achieve the aim imposed by EU law. 
 
4.2.3 Analysis 
 
The CJEU raised the question of the importance to merge or balance the 
requirements of protection of fundamental right and freedoms, in particular the 
balance between the freedoms of expression and assembly and the free movement 
of goods.
50
 The court distinguished firstly that the free movement of goods in 
certain circumstances may be subject to restrictions or for overriding 
requirements as regards to the interest of the public, as referred to in Cassis de 
Dijon.
51
 Secondly, the court pointed out that, as the freedom of expression and the 
freedoms of assembly, unlike the social right such as right to life or prohibition of 
torture, are not absolute, they may indeed together with the free movement of 
goods be restricted. Nonetheless, should these rights be restricted, it must be 
justified by a social need and be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, as 
referred to in both Familiapress
52
 and Carpenter.
53
 
 
The CJEU continued by declaring that in circumstances like these, a fair balance 
must be given between the two interests. More, it was emphasised that national 
authorities are to enjoy their margin of discretion, but with care, that is to say that 
each Member State may not need the same argument for a justification or 
restriction due to the many differences each Member State hold compared to the 
other.
54
 However, in any case, it shall be of crucial importance of the Member 
State to thoroughly assess the proportionality of the restriction. 
 
The preceding case, Commission v France,
55
 was frequently referred to in the 
judgement of Schmidberger and the court made the distinction that where the 
protesters in the first case had as their purpose to restrict trade of goods and to 
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destroy those goods, the citizens in the second were merely exercising their 
fundamental rights by in public manifesting a public opinion. Lastly, it was 
distinguished that, would the Austrian authorities instead have banned the 
demonstration, they would have severely interfered with the fundamental rights 
of the citizens to collectively and calmly express their opinions to the public. 
 
4.2.3 AG Jacobs on Schmidberger 
 
According to Advocate General (AG) Jacobs opinion, there is a certain 
importance lying within the distinction between this case and previous but similar 
situations. AG Jacobs argue that this is the first case situation where a Member 
State of the EU used the essentiality to shelter the social rights to make valid a 
restriction on an economic freedom of the EU. He further claims that the reason 
as to why situations like these have rarely occurred may be due to the fact that 
economic freedoms normally are used on the basis of wider general interests such 
as public health, rather than to the protection of the individual’s right. However, 
although AG Jacobs recognised the differences between Commission v France, he 
argued that the similarities were to be considered when measuring a potential 
justification.
56
 
 
Further, the Austrian authorities were argued to have committed a prima facie 
breach of Article 28 TFEU despite that the subject for the dispute was carried out 
by private individuals. Jacobs continued with stating his belief that cases similar 
to this inevitably will arise, arguing that fundamental social rights considerations 
recognised by the EU could be the base of the justification. When determining a 
justification in a case similar to this it should, in the AG's view,
57
 be dealt with 
through two following steps to make certain the full accuracy in the judgement. 
The first step would be for the court to make certain whether the member state 
when considering the social right was working to fulfil a valid aim in the interest 
of the public, capable of justifying this economic freedom. The second step would 
be to consider whether the restriction could be held as proportionate in relation to 
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the objective or aim pursued, consequently, he here agreed with the approach 
adopted by the CJEU. 
 
AG Jacobs discussed in Schmidberger the potential consequences occurring when 
a Member State maliciously would use the justification method and promote its 
social rights with the mere aim to escape the obligation to admit to the economic 
freedoms. He drew an example where an EU Member State holding the discretion 
of protection against unfair trade antitrust or where the social rights to freedom of 
financial activities were misused in the same way. He continued to argue that due 
to these intentional misinterpretations of the tool, it could be difficult to make 
certain or prove the illegitimate objective of the Member State.
58
 
 
 
4.3 The novelty of Schmidberger 
 
As opposed to the previously leading case on the topic, Commission v France,
59
 
the demonstration in Schmidberger
60
 had some characteristics worth to note 
making the latter case touching disputed new grounds. Firstly, the reason as to 
why the economic freedom was restricted - the demonstration - was not only 
authorised by the Austrian government according to ruling legislation, but also 
only limited to a certain time span. This made the actual limitation of the 
economic freedom controlled and the fact that it was holding a more narrow 
restriction in terms of geographical size and actual seriousness can be argued to 
make the situations initially different. Furthermore, the actual matter for which 
the protesters were carrying out their demonstration was considered important for 
the public rather than, as in Commission v France, for purposes to solely to 
restrict the sale and movement of certain goods.
61
  
 
Moreover, in Schmidberger the role played by the Austrian authorities were 
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considered of higher administrative standard as measures had been sought to in 
order to avoid any actual or potential disruptions in traffic. 
Lastly, the CJEU argued that the demonstration in Schmidberger and how it was 
dealt with in general made clear the lack of intention to negatively affect intra-
community trade streams, this, lastly made the realisation apparent that the 
Schmidberger case concerned an area not dealt with before.
62
 
 
 
4.4 Proportionality 
 
Proportionality is currently a GPEU which is drawn from the German constitution 
and foremost developed and incorporated in EU law with the case Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft.
63
  
 
Proportionality refers to the principle that the decisions made by the EU and its 
extended arms shall not go beyond the absolute necessary to fulfil the aims of the 
Treaties governing the EU. The principle has been thoroughly defined in many a 
judgement, ex parte Fedesa
64
 however hold an updated definition of the theory: 
 
“The Court has consistently held that the principle of proportionality is one of the 
general principles of Community law. By virtue of that principle, the lawfulness 
of the prohibition of an economic activity is subject to the condition that the 
prohibitory measures are appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the 
objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a 
choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least 
onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims 
pursued.” 65 
 
This extract explains a threefold test being, first whether the measure is suitable 
to achieve a legitimate objective; second, if the measure is necessary to achieve 
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this objective; third, if the measure comprise of an excessive product on the 
claimants interest. 
 
Furthermore, proportionality as distinguished by T. Tridimas, constitutes instead 
of a twofold test assessing whether the restriction used is suitable and whether it 
is necessary for the aim to be achieved; is the answers yes, the restriction then 
may be considered proportionate.
66
 Moreover, the proportionality test, be it two 
or three fold, may be considered useful in situations where the legality and the 
merits of measure on both national and EU level is of dubious nature and in need 
of being scrutinised. The proportionality test has been argued to be a more 
accurate and powerful tool, partly, as it due to its flexible nature may be used on 
different vertical levels in relation to various purposes.
67
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5 Following Case law  
5.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
Following Schmidberger appeared situations before the CJEU where the act of 
balancing of the two interests turned into a subject inevitable to thoroughly 
dissect. In 2004 the Omega case concerning the conflict between the social right 
of human dignity contra the economic freedom of movement of goods and 
provision of services was the first case to follow the Schmidberger nature. The 
CJEU declared the restriction of the economic right by the social right justified 
through the proportionality principle and scholars expressed their fear of end to 
come to the supremacy of the EU. 
 
Some three years later arose the Viking Line case concerning the freedom of 
establishment against the right to collective action and to strike. The CJEU argued 
that the restriction of the economic freedom was not proportionate to achieve the 
aim, this however was only guidance to the national court of the Member State 
and the CJEU came to decide that the proportionality test was to be carried out by 
the Member States themselves.  
 
Shortly after Viking Line came Laval, concerning nearly identical matters on the 
first glance but instead upsetting spectators in the question as to whether the 
Member States were capable of the responsibility of handling the proportionality 
test without thorough supervision. Promisucae in 2008 touched the issue of 
interplay between protection of personal data and the right intellectual property. 
This was considered a somewhat fine line where the Member States, if deciding 
the case in a wrongful manner, would contribute to detrimental results impairing 
the harmonisation of the EU. Finally, Scarlet Extended, similarly to the prior case 
concerned protection of personal data but balanced against the economic freedom 
of the service providers’ right to conduct business. The CJEU in this case went 
28 
 
back to arguing that a restriction of the social right would be acceptable should 
legislation on national level allow, it was however not a matter the EU court 
would accept. 
 
5.2 Omega 2004  
5.2.1  Facts 
 
Omega,
68
 a German company, later conducting a franchising contract with the 
British company Pulsar International, holding an arcade hall in Bonn for a variety 
of different games enjoyed by adolescents in Germany. The arcade hall was 
operating an installation called Laserdrome comprising of laser devices intending 
to look similar to machine guns and jackets to simulate the effect of bullet proof 
vests. The gun-devices that were used were developed from a childrens-toy 
commonly used and accessible on the market.  
 
Before Laserdrome was launched, the public were expressing their negative 
views of the project and it was shortly followed by the police authorities request 
of a specification of what Laserdrome involved stating that if intentions with the 
game was 'playing at killing' it was to be prohibited. As this, however, was a fact 
of the game, the authorities issued, after the launch of the game, an order 
prohibiting the game on the grounds that it wanted to avoid the risk to public 
safety and order in every individual case – a protection of human dignity. 
 
The order further declared that Laserdrome constituted a danger to the public 
order as it made the idea of death and violence insignificant and therefore 
contradicted fundamental values. After having appealed with a lack of fruitful 
results, Omega appeal a final round arguing that the order issued was infringing 
EU Law and the freedom to provide services, Article 56 TFEU
69
 as it was using 
devices supplied from Great Britain. The case was then referred to the CJEU 
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questioning the relevance of the facts with both the freedom to provide services
70
 
and the free movement of goods.
71
 
 
5.2.2 Judgement 
 
The questions of importance distinguished by the CJEU were firstly if the ban on 
an economic freedom in order to protect fundamental rights and in particular, 
human dignity was acceptable in the view of EU law. Secondly, whether the 
potential discretion held by the Member State in such case as regard the 
restriction of free movement of services and goods makes valid a legal concept 
known by all member states. 
 
The CJEU argued that the importance in this matter was to determine the extent 
to which the restriction is capable to affect the free movement of goods and 
services and they established the prohibition would affect Omega's providers and 
service receivers in Great Britain. This case concerned two economic freedoms 
simultaneously, however, in this very situation the freedom to provide services 
was argued primary, therefore the CJEU as a principle scrutinised only one of the 
two freedoms as referred to in Karner.
72
 
 
The CJEU continued to emphasise the importance to respect the now common 
tradition of the Member States to see to the ECHR. Further, the CJEU recognised 
its desire to consider human dignity a GPEU and that the social right therefore 
most certainly was compatible with EU law irrespective of its German status. 
Moreover, the protection of fundamental rights were argued to be a valid 
objective to justifying a restriction of the rules applied onto the Member State by 
EU law, despite it concerning economic freedoms.  
 
Finally, the CJEU held that prohibiting Laserdrome could not be considered 
disproportionate in relation to what be considered necessary in order to achieve 
the aim sought by the German authorities. Thus, the restriction of the economic 
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freedoms, services as well as goods, were justified on the basis of the importance 
to preserve the social right: human dignity. 
 
 
5.2.3 Analysis 
 
The AG Stix-Hackl argued in Omega for the importance of having the CJEU to 
follow correct definitions of the concept of human dignity – to make use of the 
legislated through judgments and enacted law definitions incorporated by EU law. 
The CJEU followed the suggestion, nonetheless the case has through its decision 
been argued to strongly respect the German constitutional identity. The Omega 
case can be referred to as particularly important in the sense that it was the case 
that came to follow the decision and reasoning in Schmidberger due to its 
recognition of the EU social fundamental rights.  
It has been argued that the approach that the CJEU saw need to adopt in Omega 
will open gates for the fundamental rights to take on a stronger position within the 
EU, a reason to the approach have been said to be the many sources that the 
social fundamental rights stem from. Furthermore, an importance to deeply 
scrutinise the series of events has been emphasised as the CJEU rather commonly 
refer its duties of determination regarding social right to courts other than 
themselves.
73
 
One potential risk in these situations could be that other courts, through the 
extended arm of the EU, see past the important safeguards serving to prohibit a 
decision formed, not holding the objectives commonly agreed upon. Another 
hazard to consider could be the self-determination of EU law where the final 
accumulation would lead to a danger of the EU supremacy as a whole.
74
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5.3 Viking Line 2007 
5.3.1 Facts 
 
The case Viking Line
75
 concerned a Finnish shipping company managing a ferry 
called Rosella which in its turn drove the route Tallinn - Helsinki under the 
Finnish flag. The Rosella staff were member of the trade union FSU, an extension 
of the International trade union in the field, ITF with its base in Great Britain. 
 
To enable the exercise of Estonian legislation and aid the employment of an 
Estonian crew, Viking Line sought to reflag Rosella. The company's greater aim 
however was to commence a new trade union agreement and subsequently 
achieve a lower minimum obligation of salaries. In order for the reflag to be 
approved, Viking Line sent their notification letter to FSU whereupon ITF 
initiated a dispatch forwarded to its associates, advising them to cautiously 
scrutinise and ideally decline the future dealings with Viking Line. To further 
avoid the situation, Viking Line was prohibited contact with Estonian workers 
representatives. Conjointly with the process, FSU notified authorities of its strike 
intention aiming to have Viking Line remain hiring Finnish staff under Finnish 
legislation. 
 
For this, Viking Line brought proceedings in Great Britain against FSU for breach 
of the economic freedom; freedom of establishment; appealed when unsuccessful 
and followed the case which was forwarded through a preliminary ruling to the 
CJEU. 
 
5.3.2 Judgement 
 
The CJEU recognised that the economic freedoms applied to obligations of any 
kind holding the objective to collectively regulating and make profitable 
employment or self-employment. Furthermore, the CJEU argued that a collective 
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action aiming to convince a company the entrance into a collective agreement is a 
matter of freedom of establishment
76
 due to the fact that employment regulations 
are regulated differently in Member states.  
 
Moreover, the social rights recognised through CFREU the right to collective 
action and the right to strike are additionally GPEU through its fundamental 
status. The rights, however, must through the proportionality test be balanced 
with the economic freedom in question to make an accurate judgement. 
 
The CJEU then argued that the freedom of establishment holds the status to be 
imposed on trade unions and that the importance rested upon the interrogation 
whether the actions by the union were justifiably restricted. The CJEU held that is 
was a matter of national court to decide, but that the trade unions actions 
restricted Viking Lines exercise of its freedom of establishment and could only be 
justified applying the proportionality test on the question if it was made certain 
that the staff of Viking Line was in genuine danger of unemployment. 
 
 
5.3.3 Analysis 
 
The CJEU in Viking Line, in addition to leaving the matter to the national court to 
go through with the proportionality test before referring the case, stated that this 
was to become the new procedure each court should follow. The proposition was 
met with both positive and negative response, the negative side foremost arguing 
that EU losing control over decision could never produce great outcomes for the 
union, whereas their opponents thought that a greater space taken by member 
states in decisions like these was essential in order for EU to continue develop.
77
 
AG Maduro emphasised the importance of the proportionality test and its two 
pillars of justifications and necessity, however, he argued that although social 
rights are what the EU does strive to work towards, the fundamental freedoms 
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should not by any circumstance carry a lessor weight of importance.  
Moreover, he argued that, since there are certain rules governing collective 
actions in many Member States on national basis, this could for policy reasons 
constitute a situation where the trade union would use the action in an abusive 
manner as perhaps given too much space for own interpretations.
78
 Thus, the 
economic freedom should through an assessment of the proportionality principle 
prevail where a situation brought forward merely is hypothetical and cannot 
reasonably follow. 
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5.4 Laval 2007 
5.4.1 Facts 
 
Laval
79
, a Latvian company with one of its subsidiaries in Sweden - Baltic Bygg 
AB -carried in June 2004 out renovations on a school in Vaxholm, a city located 
near Stockholm. Byggnads, a Swedish trade union for construction workers 
initiated during this time the commencement of a collective agreement with 
clauses unacceptable according to Laval who instead entered into a somewhat 
milder agreement version with a Latvian counterpart. Worth to note in this 
context was that in this situation the Member State had no specific minimum 
requirement as regards for example salary but agreements like this were 
negotiated on a basis between trade unions and organisations themselves. 
However, Byggnads started an industrial action and subsequently condemned 
both the construction work and the building. Finally, Laval brought a claim for 
their freedom to provide services, Article 56 TFEU,
80
 whereupon the matter was 
referred to CJEU for a preliminary ruling. 
 
 
5.4.2 Judgement 
 
The CJEU held that, albeit the recognition of the valid right of Byggnad to initiate 
its collective action, it did constitute a restriction on the freedom to provide 
services through making the services provided seemingly less demandable. As 
there was no actual national law governing minimum salary per se, the collective 
action in this case would only be valid if carried out under EU law to achieve a 
valid objective justifiable by the public interest. In this situation this, nonetheless 
was not considered an issue in the interest of the public, despite AG Mengozzi 
arguing to the contrary. Therefore the CJEU held that the collective action was 
not permissible. 
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5.4.3 Analysis 
 
AG Mengozzi’s argument did not correspond with that of the CJEU but delivered 
an  providing that collective actions exercised to aid claims regarding minimum 
salaries or other pay claims commonly would fulfil the principle of the 
proportionality test. Should the employees already have similar or better working 
conditions from another Member State, the proportionality would not be satisfied 
but would it merely be due to an overrated salary expectation, the action would 
still be proportionate.
81
 
Other voices on the case has argued that the judgement in Laval made cause to a 
few arching brows by observers when finding that the CJEU did not at all apply 
the proportionality principle to the full, a fact expected after having the case so 
soon follow Viking Line.
82
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5.5 Promusicae 2008 
5.5.1 Facts 
 
The case concerned a dispute between the Spanish non-profit organisation of 
media, Promusicae and the commercial undertaking Telefonica, regarding the 
declined disclosure of personal data by Telefonica to Promusicae.
83
  
 
Promusicae requested by Telefonica addresses and identity information of 
individuals to whom it served internet access support as Promisucae argued that 
these individuals had through file sharing exploited Promisucaes rights.  
 
Telefonica argued that this data only was given during criminal proceedings 
whereupon Promisucae brought a claim under EU law asking to scrutinise 
whether it would allow the Member State to protect the public interest, therefore 
excluding civil proceedings, I.E. the duty of internet operators and providers of 
data, to receive and forward data collected through conducting society service.
84
 
 
 
5.5.2 Judgement 
 
The CJEU firstly brought light to the Directive 2002/58/EC
85
 imposing the duty 
upon the Member State to keep data confidential and refrain from its storing due 
to public security. However, CJEU noted that the Directive did permit the use of 
the information where the matter would concern protection of the freedoms and 
rights of others. Hence the Directive did not prohibit the Member State to use the 
data in civil proceedings. 
 
The CJEU instructed the referring court to balance the right to protection of 
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personal data contra the right to intellectual property, and measure them through 
the articles discussed. 
 
5.5.3 Analysis 
 
It has been argued that the judgement by the CJEU concerning the approval to 
have the Member States deliver personal data in civil actions, should social rights 
be protected, hardly could be met as, in this case, balancing the right to 
intellectual property with the right to data protection would be nearly impossible. 
The potential risks in the matter has been argued occurring when the actual 
problem is referred back to the Member State with no well-defined instructions as 
to how this just balance is to be made.
86
 This, subsequently has been argued to be 
more serious an issue than recognised by the CJEU as it may comprise of 
different levels of rules throughout the EU and finally negatively affect the 
harmonisation of the EU.
87
Thus judging these situations on case by case basis 
may be the best solution.
88
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5.6 Scarlet Extended 2011 
5.6.1 Facts 
 
SABAM, a Belgian undertaking working as an agent to editors and authors was 
aiming to terminate, similarly to Promusicae, illegal file sharing in order to 
protect its clients. Scarlet,
89
 an internet service provider received an order sent on 
the initiative of SABMAN to end the software that was sharing works belonging 
to SABNAM. Scarlet appealed whereupon the case was referred to CJEU asking 
whether EU law allows Member States to have service providers filter online 
information to find illegal or prohibited material. 
 
 
5.6.2 Judgement 
 
The CJEU started with arguing that an injunction like this would entail the scan 
of a quantity of files where a great amount of innocent individuals would have 
their rights infringed. Further, the objective would be to safeguard all works, 
including future such, thus the scan would have no chronological limit.  
 
The CJEU held that the Member States was not permitted to allow the injunction 
as the authors rights were not infringed directly by the service providers but by 
third parties. However, the CJEU sought to determine whether the potential 
injunction would be in accordance with the social rights contra economic 
freedoms, that being Intellectual Property (IP) rights and freedoms to conduct a 
business, the freedom to receive information and the right to protection of 
personal data.  
The CJEU held that, should it admit to this injunction, the Member State would 
fail to respect the obligation to adhere to a proportionate balance between the 
interests as it would consequence in the infringement of the economic freedom of 
the service provider to conduct business and its customers right to protection of 
personal data and right to receive information. 
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5.6.3 Analysis 
 
AG Cruz Villalon agreed in this case with the CJEU that the injunction to protect 
IP rights of the authors referred to, would constitute an infringement of the social 
right of the information holders. For this injunction not to be infringing, it would 
have to be in balance with the obligations provided for by the CFREU and must 
therefore be interpreted as affecting the quality of law. 
Villalon further argued that the CFREU admits to the use of the social rights and 
economic freedoms on the permission that the restriction of either would have to 
be proportionate in accordance with legislation. Hence, restricting the third 
parties through an injunction in said situation and their freedoms and rights to the 
use of the internet would only be justified was it enforced through the clear 
national legislation of the Member State. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the central aim with this thesis has been to scrutinise the interplay 
through the transformation of the two interests, the economic freedoms and the 
social rights within the EU. The introductory chapters were foremost focusing on 
making certain the definitions and origins of the scope. The economic objectives 
were holding a more significant position than the social such, already by the time 
of the commencement of the union and its early days with the TOP. However the 
social aim was as abovementioned incorporated in the ECHR during these early 
days as well, nonetheless the social rights were not given its current status, 
comparable with the economic such until many years later with the restructuring 
and the TOL. I decided to make these chapters hold a little more space than 
perhaps expected as I found the actual transformation in the status of the interests 
an important part in the later scrutinising of the situations occurring when the 
prerogatives finally conflicted. In this coming conflict I found it of great 
importance to have the knowledge of the development in order to understand the 
judgements and reasoning by the CJEU and learned scholars. This conflict indeed 
was the aim of the following chapter and I here brought to light the first CJEU 
judgement on this balance of the two interests, Schmidberger. As argued, the 
conflict has happened prior to Schmidberger, nonetheless, the significance with 
this judgement was in addition to the tone in which the two interests met, how the 
CJEU decided to deal with the encounter. Furthermore, this chapter dealt with 
how the court decided to set a standard and consequently create decisions in how 
future cases approaching this conflict should handle the issue. The case concerned 
EU citizens exercising their fundamental right to expression and right to 
assembly. A company argued that actions infringed their fundamental freedom to 
exercise a free movement of goods. As stated, the two interests hold equal value 
and in said case the two interests exercised were on the first glance of same 
priority to handle, as opposed to the situation in Commission v France. The CJEU 
therefore saw no other solution than to resort to a principle sofar rarely used in 
the context, the proportionality principle and the developed proportionality test: 
Was the restriction of the company’s freedom of movement of goods justifiable 
with the EU citizen’s exercise of their right to expression and assembly, although 
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these fundamental rights are not considered absolute?  
 
The proportionality test considers the situation in judging both necessity and 
suitability for the aim to be achieved. In Schmidberger the CJEU therefore went 
through and asked whether restricting the company’s freedom to transporting 
goods was suitable in order for the protesters to carry out their original act, 
demonstrating on the Brenner motorway. They then asked whether it was 
necessary and not an act of going ‘too far’ in doing so to achieve the aim. The 
CJEU then established that the act was proportionate through the test and held 
that the restriction of the economic freedom was justified. Novel to Schmidberger 
was additionally the matter of using the balancing act of the two interests in 
situations concerning individual rights and freedoms rather than that of the public 
as a whole. Furthermore, as also defined, balancing economic freedoms against 
rights not holding an absolute status, then having these rights weigh heavier, was 
somewhat surprising and original to the situation.  
 
Following the Schmidberger case was the Omega, Viking Line, Laval, 
Promisucae and the Scarlet Extended case on the same topic but concerning 
different economic freedoms and social rights. Omega contributed in showing 
that a trend was set and came along with stipulations of dangers and fear of the 
EU supremacy to be put to an end. Moreover, with Viking Line proceeded the 
decision that it was for the national court to conduct the proportionality test which 
in the later cases came to bring forward a potential threat to the harmonisation of 
the EU if the test was not carried out under strict supervision, furthermore, fear of 
having Member States use the test maliciously should they argue in favour of a 
social right just to diminish and escape the obligation to uphold an economic 
freedom started to grow. 
 
Any threat to the supremacy of EU law and additionally the harmonisation of the 
law should indeed be taken seriously. The reason to the fear may stem in the 
CJEU giving more authority to national courts when decisions concerns as fragile 
subjects as human and economic interests, or worse, that the CJEU would 
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interpret the matter wrongfully themselves due to national differences.
90
 
 
Finally, the consequences could indeed be detrimental considering the fact that 
national standards can vary in both fields. Having any other standard, than a by 
the EU formed such, in considering the social rights, could constitute in human 
beings and their needs not being sought to in order to gain more beneficial 
economic situations; and indeed the other way around as well.  
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